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The States Must Be Crazy: Dissent and the Puzzle of 
Repressive Persistence
Christian Davenport, Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame, United States
Cyanne Loyle, Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, United States
According to forty years worth of research, dissent always increases repression whereas state coercive behavior has a range of different influences on dissident 
activity. If the outcome of government action is uncertain, why do authorities continue to apply repression? We explore this “puzzle of repressive persistence” 
using official records of U.S. government activities against the Republic of New Africa, a Black Nationalist organization active in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. In particular, we investigate three proposed answers to the puzzle: repression is effective but in a way not currently considered; repression functions by 
mechanisms not hitherto considered by quantitative researchers; or those who use repression are not actually interested in eliminating dissent. We find that 
persistence in this case can be attributed to: 1) a long-term plan to eliminate challengers deemed threatening to the U.S. political-economy and 2) the in-
fluence of particular agents of repression engaged in a crusade against Black radicals. Both factors increased the likelihood of continued coercion despite 
short-term failure; indeed such an outcome actually called for additional repressive action. These insights open up a new area of research for conflict scholars 
interested in occurrence, persistence and escalation.
For approximately forty years, quantitative researchers have 
tried to understand the relationship between political dis-
sent and state repression, commonly referred to as the “dis-
sent/conflict-repression nexus” (e.g., Lichbach 1987). 
Understanding the interaction between dissident behavior 
and state repression is important because, at its core, it rep-
resents one of the most crucial elements of modern life – 
the former (dissent) identifying an effort to bring about 
political, economic, and/or social change by raising the 
costs of governance and the latter (repression) identifying 
an effort to create as well as protect the status quo by raising 
the costs of collective action. Essentially, two conclusions 
can be drawn from this body of work. On the one hand, 
dissent always increases repressive behavior (Cingranelli 
and Richards 1999; Davenport 1995, 1996, 1999; Davenport 
2005; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Franklin 1997; 
Gartner and Regan 1996; Hibbs 1973; King 1998; Poe and 
Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Regan and Henderson 
2002). On the other hand, repression has a variety of dif-
ferent influences on dissent. For example, it has been found 
to increase it (Gurr and Duvall 1973), decrease it (White 
1993), alternatively decrease or increase it depending upon 
context (Boswell and Dixon 1990; Bwy 1968; Gupta and Ve-
nieris 1981; Weede 1987), decrease it over time (Rasler 
1996), lead to substitution where one form is decreased 
while another is increased (Moore 1998; Shellman 2007), 
and have no impact whatsoever (Gurr and Moore 1997).
These results are puzzling and different researchers have at-
tempted to explain the varied outcomes in diverse ways (e.g., 
using new data or a new method, or developing new theory) 
but the focus of the current paper follows from these 
puzzles: we seek to understand why, when the impact of re-
pressive action on dissent is believed to be variable (i.e., the 
We would like to thank the national science foun-
dation and the order, conflict and violence program 
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outcome of repression is not generally known), authorities 
would continue to use coercion? Are states “crazy,” re-
peatedly using a policy that does not always work or is their 
some method to the madness? Although current research 
does not explicitly address this question, when one consults 
the literature relevant to the topic numerous answers 
emerge, none of which have been examined explicitly.
Within this article, we explore three explanations for re-
pressive persistence: 1) repression may work as a “regula-
tory” activity but not in the way currently examined; 2) 
repression may work differently than expected; and 3) gov-
ernment objectives may be different than currently theor-
ized. To do this, we deviate from existing work and use a 
unique database on the interaction between the United 
States government and a Black nationalist organization 
called the Republic of New Africa (RNA) between 1968 and 
1973. These data were compiled from records of fifteen dif-
ferent local, state, and federal policing organizations as well 
as a wide variety of other archival material, by the street 
address (spatial unit) – hour (temporal unit), for all events 
between 1968 (the founding of the organization) and 1973 
(considered to be a low point for the organization, if not its 
end). Such a design is necessary to examine the competing 
arguments discussed above – something that is extremely 
difficult to accomplish within the traditional large-N 
framework. This design clearly complements other re-
search, providing some insight into a puzzle that has lain 
unaddressed within conflict studies for quite a while as well 
as providing some directions for further investigation.
 We find that in the case of the RNA it is best to view re-
pressive persistence as part of a broader government policy 
to: 1) eliminate a behavioral threat (i.e., secession) which, if 
successful, could upset the political system and 2) sustain a 
particular ethic within the repressive apparatus that was 
largely anti-black as well as anti-radical. The existing re-
search here assists us in understanding why repression is 
applied despite varied behavioral outcomes, returning us to 
some of the earliest theories where government coercion 
was prominently featured. In the conclusion, we outline 
how such insights can be integrated into the large-N, 
quantitative investigations that currently predominate.
1. Understanding the Conflict-Repression Nexus
 For most researchers in political science and sociology the 
interaction between governments and dissidents is one of 
dueling combatants (e.g., Dahl 1966; Hobbes [1651] 1950; 
Lichbach 1995; Machiavelli [1513] 1980; Pierskalla 2010). 
In this scenario, each actor attempts to influence the other 
by using diverse coercive strategies (respectively protest/
dissent for challengers and protest policing/repression for 
governments), attempting to alter the opponents’ willing-
ness to continue their current path of action. It is suggested 
within this work that if neither actor engaged in pro-
vocative behavior, then there would be no need for co-
ercion. If nobody moved (i.e., challenged the other), then it 
is expected that nobody would get hurt, so to speak. If one 
side moved, however, then a counter-move is expected and 
some form of dissent/coercion would be applied. This 
would continue until one side quit or was defeated.1
Consequently, challengers use certain tactics to raise the 
costs of political order, compelling authorities to withdraw 
from or engage in specific policies and/or practices. Here, 
sit-ins, petitions, strikes, demonstrations, terrorist acts, and 
insurgent attacks are expected to diminish the perceived 
legitimacy of authorities (through increased disruption 
within society) and political leaders are prompted to reas-
sess the relative gains derived from giving in to challengers 
or persisting in their current activities. Given the objectives 
of challengers and the way in which challenging tactics are 
used, it is understandable that authorities engage in state 
repression when confronted with challenges. Such behavior 
is intended to protect established institutions, practices, 
and individuals or clear the way for new ones by raising the 
costs of challenging activity. Arrests, detention, verbal har-
assment, beatings, targeted assassinations, and mass killings 
alter the decision calculus of those in opposition. Con-
sequently, movement participants are prompted to reassess 
1 There are other alternatives (e.g., exit/flight or 
accommodation) but these are not generally con-
sidered in the work discussed here.
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the relative gains of giving in to authorities or persisting in 
their struggle.
 Adopting the view described above, the research design 
 employed to investigate the conflict-repression nexus is 
relative ly straightforward. Generally, the influence of repres-
sive and dissident behavior at time t is inferred from exam-
ining values of dissident and repressive behavior, 
respective ly, at time t + 1 compared to those at time t – 1. If 
dissent increases after repression has taken place, then re-
pressive behavior is deemed “unsuccessful” because govern-
ment coercive action did not diminish the challenger’s 
activity. If repression increases after dissent has taken place, 
then dissident activity is deemed “unsuccessful” because 
challenging behavior did not diminish government coercion. 
There are some variants on this basic theme. For example, 
most researchers consider contemporaneous impacts. In this 
context, the effect of relevant behavior is anticipated within 
a single unit of time. Such a perspective lies implicit within 
the work referenced; while none of this is discussed openly 
and in detail, it nevertheless follows logically.
 Exploring a wide variety of places, periods, and oper-
ationalizations (for both behavioral challenges and re-
pression), it is clear that conflict theorists have been 
partially correct in their characterization of what takes 
place. On the one hand, behavioral challenges consistently 
increase state repressive action (Cingranelli and Richards 
1999; Davenport 1995, 2005, 2007a, b; Franklin 1997; 
Gartner and Regan 1996; Hibbs 1973; King 1998; Poe and 
Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Leith 1999; Regan and Henderson 
2002). Certain types of challenges have a greater impact 
than others (e.g., violent behavior relative to non-violent 
activity, which further supports the threat hypothesis), but 
the basic finding is robust across examinations. On the 
other hand, findings are mixed with regard to the influence 
of repression on behavioral challenges – especially dissent, 
which is the focus of this article and the area that has re-
ceived the most empirical attention. To date, researchers 
have found almost every relationship. For example, as Dav-
enport states (2005, vii):
Confronted with state repression, dissidents have been found to 
run away (e.g., White 1993), fight harder (e.g., Eckstein 1965; 
Feirabend and Feirabend 1972; Gurr and Duvall 1973; Koran 
1990; Khawaja 1993; Francisco 1996), and alternatively run away 
or fight (e.g., Bwy 1968; Gurr 1969; Gupta and Venieris 1981; 
Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Weede 1987; Rasler 1996; Moore 1998) 
– varying according to political-economic context. Additionally, 
work has been found where there is no response whatsoever.2
2. The Puzzle of Repressive Persistence
 To date, research investigating the dissent-repression nexus 
has been dedicated to understanding how the two forms of 
conflict influence one another. Building off this work, how-
ever, we take the conclusions of forty years worth of em-
pirical research, accept its validity and attempt to 
understand one puzzle that emerges when all of this is 
viewed together: given the mixed effectiveness of state co-
ercion in diminishing political dissent, why would govern-
ments continue to apply repressive behavior? This we refer to 
as the “Puzzle of Repressive Persistence.” Within research 
focused on the relationship between conflict and repression 
no explicit attention has been given to this issue. Reading 
this body of work creatively and drawing upon other areas 
of research, however, allows several arguments to be devel-
oped. To initiate this discussion, we present the most closely 
related argument emerging from the work of Ted Gurr 
(1988), which proves to be useful, but ultimately limited. 
Three extensions of this basic argument are then provided, 
the plausibility of which is explored in the RNA case.
2.1. Gurr’s Coercive State Thesis
Our investigation of Repressive Persistence begins with what 
appears to be among the oldest and most straightforward of 
explanations. In 1988,Ted Gurr sought to theoretically 
understand the circumstances that led to the creation and 
continuation of some of the most powerful organizations in 
human history and to generate testable propositions. One of 
these organizations, and the one most relevant to the cur-
rent discussion, concerns state security forces. These are im-
portant because they engage in state repression.
According to Gurr’s argument, repressive behavior is enacted 
for two distinct reasons. In his first proposition, he argues that:
2 This work is not as robust as the one mentioned 
where dissent uniformly increases repression, as 
findings are not as stable when different variables, 
methods, and contexts are applied.
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States involved in recurring episodes of violent conflict tend (a) 
to develop and maintain institutions specialized in the exercise 
of coercion; and (b) to develop elite political cultures that sanc-
tion the use of coercion in response to challenges and perceived 
threats. (Gurr 1988, 50)
Following this logic, one could make the case that repression 
would be used by political authorities despite variation in be-
havioral outcomes (i.e., its influence on dissent, terrorism and 
insurgency) after these tactics have been employed because 
this is simply what institutions that specialize in “the exercise 
of coercion” do. From this perspective, repressive action 
sometimes works to reduce behavioral challenges and some-
times it does not, but repression would be applied regardless 
because this is what the actors and institutions engage in.
While moving in the right direction, we find this is a some-
what unsatisfactory answer to the puzzle identified above 
for two reasons. On the one hand, there is some variation 
in government repression against internal challengers that 
have been involved in “recurring episodes of violent con-
flict.” The US government, for instance, which clearly fits 
under the category of a recurring episode of violent con-
flict during the mid to late 1960s,3 wielded repressive ac-
tion against communists and the Black Panther party quite 
differently from how it responded to laborers (especially 
after the Wagner Act of 1935) and the Ku Klux Klan. On 
the other hand, the consequence of ignoring information 
about behavioral challenges likely varies across distinct ac-
tors. For example, for much of the Cold War anti-radical 
persecution was acceptable in the West but this was much 
less the case toward the end or immediately afterward. The 
result: just having a specialized institution that uses co-
ercion does not seem to address the point about varying 
outcomes, leading to another proposition.
 In the second circumstance favorable to repressive action, 
Gurr argues:
To the extent that coercive strategies lead to conflict outcomes fa-
vorable for the political elite, their preference for those strategies 
in future conflict situations is reinforced. To the extent that coer-
cive strategies have unfavorable outcomes, political elites will 
prefer noncoercive strategies in future conflicts (Gurr 1988, 50).
Here, governments repress in situations where they be-
lieve it will work for them (i.e., it is successful). What is 
“success”? Well, Gurr argues that “successful use of co-
ercion enhances leaders’ assessment of its future utility” 
(1988, 49). What makes a political leader think that their 
future benefits would be great? While not exactly clear, it 
seems to be the case that this involves the containment 
and/or elimination of politically important rivals. As 
Gurr argues (1988: 47):
… all durable states of the modern world established and conso-
lidated rule over their national territories by the successful use of 
force: by revolution; by suppressing rebellions and secessions; by 
forcibly subordinating and integrating, in diverse combinations 
and sequences, neighboring peoples, reluctant aborigines, ethnic 
minorities, lords and merchants, peasants and laborers, kulaks 
and capitalists.
Containment and/or elimination thus seem to be crucial for 
establishing and consolidating rule, and ultimately maxi-
mizing government utility, which appears to be the objective 
of governance and the principal conclusion of Gurr’s piece.
Gurr’s second proposition is a step in the right direction 
toward addressing the problem of Repressive Persistence, 
but it ultimately fails as an explanation because of a series 
of unresolved issues that remain.
First, it is unclear what constitutes “containment” and 
“elimination.” The latter seems clear: the entity making the 
claim against authorities is vanquished and disappears. The 
former seems less so. In the case of containment, the entity 
making the claim against authorities is limited somehow, 
tamed. Although Gurr does not argue this, it seems reason-
able to argue that containment would be revealed if the 
challenger’s challenge was diminished in some way: i.e., re-
duced in frequency and/or degree of radicalization (the 
displacement of existing leaders from office as well as the 
magnitude of overall change desired).
3 This judgment is made based upon the 
country’s experience with the War of Independence, 
wars against various Indian nations, the Civil War, 
the labor wars, the struggle for civil rights and the 
black power movement, as well as diverse episodes 
of urban unrest.
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Second, it is unclear what the relevant unit of analysis is 
within Gurr’s discussion of successful repression. He ap-
pears to suggest that some kind of running evaluation is 
conducted, where contentious interactions at the nation-
year unit of analysis are evaluated for relative success or 
failure and government actions are taken accordingly (i.e., 
repress or not). Where repressive action has been successful 
in the past (i.e., challengers were contained or eliminated), 
it will be employed in the future; where repressive action 
has failed in the past, it will not be employed. This is prob-
lematic in the sense that it is unclear how political auth-
orities evaluate contentious politics. For example, how far 
back do governments look in their evaluations? Do govern-
ments consider all challengers together at the nation and 
year or simply those that are confronted at some local unit 
and some lower level of temporal aggregation? By what 
metric do governments evaluate their activities (in hours, 
days, weeks, months, quarters, years, or by campaign)? 
These issues need to be addressed and units of analysis 
should be clearly specified.
 Third, there is a serious tension between the two proposi-
tions built into Gurr’s argument. In the first, governments 
are completely irrational and ignore new information. In 
the second, governments are completely rational and fol-
low new information perfectly. We believe that a reasonable 
response to Repressive Persistence should be clear on 
exactly what drives the explanation.
 Fourth, it is not clear exactly what challenges Gurr deems 
worthy of attention. He appears to suggest that only chal-
lenges that could result in the complete disruption of the 
government would be worthy of consideration, but there is 
no reason to maintain this position. It is not apparent that 
governments know which challenges could result in their 
removal and/or significant modification. As a result, it is 
possible that they would keep their eyes on a wide variety 
of challengers.
The questions raised by Gurr’s propositions are useful be-
cause the answers frame the various answers to the puzzle 
that we put forward below. Following from Gurr’s ar-
gument we offer three possible explanations for repressive 
persistence.
2.2. Repression Works – But Differently than How It Is Typically Examined
 The first answer to the persistence puzzle is that repression 
is effective but in a different way than currently considered. 
Most closely connected with the examinations of the dis-
sent-repression nexus discussed above, there are three vari-
ants of this argument. In one, discussed by Rasler (1996), 
the impact of repression is not contemporaneous but lagged 
(i.e., repressive behavior at time t does not influence dis-
sent at time t but much later [time t + n]). Alternatively, 
Lichbach (1987) and Moore (1998) suggest that the impact 
of repression on dissent is not simply revealed where prior 
repressive action decreases subsequent dissident behavior 
as the literature generally maintains. Rather, it is argued 
that “substitution” exists where repression decreases certain 
forms of dissent (generally violent behavior) while increasing 
other forms (non-violent behavior). A third variant of this 
argument highlights a different kind of substitution effect. 
Similar to dissidents engaging in different types of be-
havior, authorities may also use distinct methods of in-
fluence depending upon the threat faced. For example, 
governments may attempt to accommodate certain dissident 
interests – in some way incorporating challengers into the 
system or paying them off (Gamson 1975; Krain 2000). 
This is crucial to address because if one actor were ex-
clusively focused on repressive behavior but ignored ac-
commodative efforts, then it might mischaracterize the 
state’s influence. In short, dissent might just as well be in-
fluenced by accommodation as repression.
2.3. Repression Works – But Differently than Theorized
 The second answer to the persistence puzzle maintains that 
state coercion is effective but functions in a way that is not 
considered by quantitative researchers. This argument 
draws upon qualitative and historical literature on social 
movements and covert repressive activity (e.g., physical 
and electronic surveillance, informants and agents pro-
vocateurs [Marx 1988; Cunningham 2004; Davenport 
2005]). In this work, the objective of state repression is not 
the reduction of overt dissident behavior but rather the 
“pacification” of dissident claims-making and/or the re-
duction of the various activities that dissidents engage in 
prior to contentious dissident behavior (e.g., meetings, the 
development and articulation of movement objectives, 
training, recruitment, and so forth). Here, authorities at-
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tempt to substantively alter the degree of threat presented 
by challenges through reducing the degree of radicalism of 
group objectives (e.g., from revolution to reform) and/or 
preempting overt challenges.
 This approach to the topic represents an important shift in 
how we understand the persistence puzzle, for it suggests 
that it is irrelevant whether actual dissident activity is 
modified by repression (e.g., the number of protest events 
observed and coded during a particular temporal unit). 
What is more important is what precedes and underlies 
these efforts at social change (e.g., what dissidents talk 
about wanting to do, how many dissidents show up, 
whether or not dissidents meet, and for how long).
To date, no systematic work has been done on this ar-
gument. While much research attempts to understand so-
cial movement trajectories (highlighting the use of the 
repressive tactics discussed above) and many attempts have 
been made to understand how and why covert repression is 
applied, no-one has rigorously tracked exactly how and in 
what manner covert repressive action influences claims-
making or pre- and post-mobilization, thus addressing the 
punishment puzzle explicitly.
2.4. Who Cares if Repression Works? A Different and Older Take on Persistence
 The third and final answer to the persistence puzzle sug-
gests that those who use repression are not interested in 
eliminating dissent; in other words, there are other ends to 
which repressive action is put that outweigh the concerns 
of behavioral control. For example, drawing upon Durk-
heim’s work on punishment (1933), it could be argued that 
repression is less about deterring or controlling dissidents 
than it is about unifying societal opinion (Walter 1969). 
Here, repressive action against deviance informs those not 
directly targeted about what is and is not deemed accept-
able within the relevant community. In a sense, it is the 
(behavior and attitudes of the) general population that be-
comes the target of repressive control, not the behavior of 
specific challengers. 
 A diverse array of theorists most prominently represented 
by Marx and Pushakanis (Garland 1990), but including 
others as well (Chomsky and Herman 1979; Donner 1990; 
Petras 1987; Pion-Berlin 1989; Stanley 1996) suggest that 
techniques of punishment like repression are less about be-
havioral regulation than about protecting specific political-
economic relations (i.e., protection rackets). In this case, 
repressive behavior serves as a mechanism by which those 
who benefit from particular exploitative relationships are 
allowed to continue in their exploitation.
 A different variant of the argument returns to Gurr but ex-
tends his proposition. In Gurr’s first proposition repression 
would be continued because this is what specialists in co-
ercion do. One could also view the occurrence of per-
sistence despite varying behavioral outcomes as a form of 
bureaucratic extension (Foucault 1977; Gurr 1986). Within 
the work just identified above, authorities are less attuned 
to the vicissitudes of dissident behavior than they are to the 
internal dynamics of repressive and governing organiz-
ations themselves. For example, it is expected that once re-
pressive organizations have been created and become 
active, employees will have a vested interest in perpetuating 
the use of coercive action. As a consequence of this, one 
would likely see increased attempts to institutionalize and 
extend the application of repression to greater numbers of 
problems (e.g., Lustick 2006). This is less tied to how in-
stitutions initially came into being than what any self-inter-
ested institution will do to maintain its access to resources. 
With little to no disaggregated data on the subject, there 
has been no consideration of this explanation (but see 
Cunningham 2004 for an important exception).
3. (Re)Configuring the Analysis of State Repression
In order to rigorously investigate all of the arguments made 
in the last section, a new approach to repressive behavior is 
required. For example, according to the first explanation 
offered above (repression works – but differently than it is 
typically examined), repression would be most likely at the 
beginning of a dissident campaign or in direct response to 
the number of dissident activities initiated, trailing off over 
time. If repressive behavior is repeatedly applied without 
dissident behavior, however, or if repression precedes dis-
sident activity, then this suggests that authorities are not 
waiting for lagged effects. Alternatively, repressive behavior 
would be most likely applied when the most threatening 
forms of dissent appear and prior to any switch in dissident 
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tactics. After the tactical shift has taken place or in situ-
ations when the most threatening behavior has diminished, 
repression is expected to be withdrawn. Finally, in a dif-
ferent variant of this argument, repression would be most 
likely applied when accommodative policies are non-exist-
ent. When such activities are undertaken, then repressive 
behavior is more likely to be reduced. This suggests the 
need for an alternative empirical specification which ac-
counts for these possible variations in repressive activity.
Examination of the second explanation for the persistence 
puzzle (repression works – but differently than theorized) 
requires other considerations. In this case, one must identify 
and examine pre-mobilization challenging activity and look 
for changes – both contemporaneously as well as over time. 
Repression is expected when pre-mobilization is increasing 
or at a high point. State coercive behavior is withdrawn 
when pre-mobilization is pacified (i.e., made less radical) 
and/or significantly diminished in efficiency (i.e., when 
fewer people attend, when greater numbers of fearful ex-
pressions are made and when fewer individuals participate).
Finally, the third explanation for the puzzle of repressive 
persistence (those who use repression are not interested in 
eliminating dissent) compels researchers to consider factors 
other than contentious politics. For example, in one variant 
of this argument one must focus on the influence of re-
pression on public opinion. In another, individuals must 
focus on the structure of the political economy, exploring 
the degree to which repressive action protects/extends these 
arrangements. In the third variant, researchers must focus 
on the influence of repression on the repressive apparatus 
itself (e.g., its morale, its access to resources and the impact 
on the interaction with political-economic elites).
4. The Republic of New Africa vs. the US Government
 From the discussion, it is clear that the standard investi-
gation of the dissent-repression nexus is ill equipped to ad-
dress the insights provided by the diverse arguments 
highlighted in the last section. Toward this end, we outline 
the state-dissident interaction of interest to this study, ad-
dressing the challenger, the government’s response to them 
and then the data collection effort that facilitated the 
analysis.
4.1. We Shall Overthrow: Black Power and Freeing the Land
The social movement whose behavioral challenge we con-
centrate on was named the Republic of New Africa or 
RNA. Disgruntled with the ineffectiveness of the civil 
rights approach to modifying American attitudes and 
conditions, observing a continuation of white violence 
despite the adoption of certain laws, and influenced by 
the political theorization and strategies of Malcolm X, a 
small band of Detroit-area activists joined with Black 
Nationalists from around the United States (e.g., the Rev-
olutionary Action Movement and the Deacons for De-
fense and Justice) and founded the RNA on March 31, 
1968 (Obadele 1995).
The primary objective of the Republic of New Africa was 
to establish African-American independence from the 
United States government; specifically, it sought: 1) land 
for the establishment of an independent country in the 
deep South: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
South Carolina (the so-called “Black Belt”); 2) a plebiscite 
among Blacks in order to determine the “national status” 
of the “New Afrikan population in North America”; and 
3) reparations for the treatment of Blacks as slaves (Re-
public of New Africa 1968). The strategy was clearly ar-
ticulated. For example, the RNA would take advantage of 
a numerical concentration of African Americans to secure 
the election of diverse public officials who were support-
ive of the Republic. Once in power, these individuals 
would appoint sympathizers to the cause as well as 
members of the Black Legion (the military unit) in order 
to protect and serve the African American nation – effec-
tively deputizing an army and initiating a technique of 
electoral secessionism. Following domino theory, the RNA 
would start with one locale and then progressively move 
through the other states. If, at any time along this path, 
the US government attempted to block any of these ef-
forts, then the organization threatened to employ guerilla 
warfare in inner cities throughout the country until they 
were granted what they desired. Differing from most se-
cessionist groups, the RNA did not try to hide their strat-
egy. The objectives and plans were communicated via 
RNA press release, speeches, and publications as well as 
through interviews on radio and television and in popular 
magazines like Esquire.
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To accomplish these objectives, the organization engaged in 
many legal forms of protest: rallies, petitions, political edu-
cation courses, food drives, lectures, conferences, and the 
publication of “independent” newsletters/papers, as well as 
other activities long-established in Black communities 
(e.g., armed “self-defense” programs [deacons]). The 
group also engaged in efforts to legally separate parts of the 
United States: it began purchasing land in Mississippi for 
the capital of the new nation, elected a government, and at-
tempted to develop a security force/army – the Black 
Legion (an admittedly small unit with limited military ca-
pability). To signify the independence they sought, 
members adorned themselves with African cloth and many 
changed their “slave” names to alternatives befitting liber-
ated individuals. Members of the Republic also engaged in 
diverse illegal and violent activities: robberies, shootouts 
with police, shooting practice, plots to bomb state and fed-
eral buildings, and even a plane hijacking.
4.2. Repressing the “Negro Threat”
Unsurprisingly, the United States government (in and out 
of Detroit) did not sit idly by in the face of the RNA – re-
gardless of how improbable the group’s objectives might 
seem now or might have seemed at the time. The auth-
orities were well aware of what was at stake and took the 
group seriously. An FBI memo from Detroit to Chicago 
published in 1973 (File #157-907, section 55), identified 
the RNA as being “engaged in activities which could in-
volve a violation of Title 13, United States Code (USC) Sec-
tion 2383 (Rebellion or Insurrection), 2385 (Advocating 
Overthrow of the Government), Title 22, USC, Section 401 
and 1934 (Neutrality Matters) and Title 18, USC, Chapter 
12, Section 231 (Anti-riot laws)”. As such, the RNA 
threatened the core aspects of the US government and civil 
society. Set against the backdrop of summer riots that re-
sulted in millions of dollars worth of damage, dozens of 
deaths, and increased racial tension throughout most cities 
in the United States – especially in the North – the poten-
tial threat was immense.
The US government applied a wide variety of techniques 
against the RNA in order to identify, counter, and/or elim-
inate their behavioral challenge; overt techniques such as 
arrests, raids and grand juries were employed by the police 
and courts (Earl 2003; Goldstein 1978; Wolfe 1978). Such 
an approach followed a general pattern established across 
most cities during the time – commonly referred to as the 
“escalatory force” model (McPhail, Schweingruber, and 
McCarthy 1998). Covert activities by police and intelli-
gence organizations, including wiretaps, physical surveil-
lance, informants, and agents provocateurs, were also 
employed (Marx 1988; Cunningham 2004; Davenport 
2005). These strategies were employed to identify who was 
involved in social movements, as well as how they were re-
cruited (so that these processes could be disrupted), what 
activities challenging organizations were involved in (fre-
quently ahead of time so that authorities could pre-empt 
them), and to identify as well as counter any behavior 
deemed worthy of attention.
The question most relevant to the conflict-repression 
nexus is, how did this repression influence the RNA? Ac-
cording to most research, repressive behavior was generally 
effective in eliminating this social movement. For example, 
Pinkney, highlighting overt repressive behavior, notes 
(1976, 125–26):
Since its inception the Republic of New Africa has encountered 
friction wherever it has attempted to operate. … In August [of 
1971] the headquarters [which moved from Detroit to the Sou-
th] was raided by Mississippi policemen and agents of the Fede-
ral Bureau of Investigation. During the raid two policemen were 
wounded by gunfire. … The incident in Mississippi has … signa-
led the demise of the Republic of New Africa.
Brisbane offers a similar account (1974, 184–85). High-
lighting covert repressive activity, Tyson notes that “the 
COINTELPRO operation, the FBI’s effort to disrupt and 
divide the Black movement, often by illegal means,” took a 
toll (1999, 303–4).
While insightful, it is problematic that these accounts are 
not based on any detailed investigation of the topic. Al-
though they demonstrate generally that repression was ef-
fective at decreasing RNA dissident activity, it is not exactly 
clear how well individual instances of repression succeeded 
in influencing relevant behavior, which is the core unit of 
analysis for empirical research on the topic. To understand 
the influence of repressive behavior on social movements, 
therefore, one has to rigorously investigate the subject.
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5. Researching the Republic of New Africa
Our primary source for our investigation of how re-
pression influenced the RNA comes from what is com-
monly referred to as a “Red Squad” file. These records are 
compiled from diverse organizations principally city-based 
but extending up to state and federal levels and across di-
verse aspects of governments: police departments, judicial 
institutions (e.g., the Justice Department and district 
courts), intelligence organizations (e.g., FBI, CIA, State De-
partment, and the Army), and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice. The objective of the Red Squad was twofold: 1) to 
monitor behavior that was deemed radical in its intent, vi-
olent, or relevant to “national security” (Donner 1990, 3) 
and 2) to eliminate targeted organizations.
The RNA records housed at the [self identifying reference] 
include files from Detroit Police Department (Special In-
vestigations, Demonstration Detail, Intelligence Division, 
Inspectional Service Bureau, Security Unit, Detective Divi-
sion, Criminal Division, Public Complaints Division, and 
Tactical Reconnaissance), the Michigan State Police 
(Special Investigation Bureau, Special Investigation Unit), 
the Internal Revenue Service, the US Department of State, 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. From these files, 
repression of the RNA was coded to identify the type of ac-
tivity undertaken by state authorities (e.g., instances of 
physical and electronic surveillance, wire-tapping, and the 
forging of letters by authorities), the identity of the organ-
ization involved in the action, the number of agents in-
volved, location, date, and time. Event type is subdivided 
into two areas: overt repressive action (e.g., arrests, raids, 
and harassment) and covert repressive action (e.g., physical 
and electronic surveillance). 
 Coded characteristics of dissident behavior include the 
type of activity undertaken by RNA members (e.g., busi-
ness meetings, fundraising, shooting practice, riots, dem-
onstrations, political education courses, petitions, 
speeches), the identity of individuals in attendance and 
their participation in the organization’s activities, number 
of people in attendance, location, date, and time. This is 
relevant for the current research, because it allows us to 
gauge the influence of arrests and instances on dissident 
behavior where informants are suspected, if meetings are 
held, how many people were present within them, how 
many people spoke at these events, what did they speak 
about as well as what did the relevant personnel do (e.g., 
talking, training, lecturing, leafleting, protesting, taking tar-
get practice, and so forth). Equally as important, we can do 
this by the week, as well as explore lagged values from the 
relevant date. This is important for we use the week as the 
principal unit by which government considers its effective-
ness (a concern raised by our discussion of Gurr). Such an 
approach seems reasonable for the police appeared to em-
ploy this unit in their compilations.
 In addition to the event-based information we rely upon 
other materials as well to contextualize what we observe. 
For example, the archive contains police and civilian re-
ports about the period, an extensive compilation of local 
and national newspaper articles about the RNA and police 
activity against them, some public opinion surveys con-
ducted around the period of interest, as well as Republic of 
New Africa records such as internal memos, personal 
letters, flyers, posters, and a biography of one of its leaders. 
Over the last few years there has also been a respectable 
amount of scholarship generated about the black national-
ist movement. We utilize the information contained within 
these records as well to engage in something of a plausibil-
ity probe of the various propositions identified above. This 
is done because given the complex nature of the arguments 
put forward it would be very difficult to apply the type of 
analysis most commonly used when examining the con-
flict-repression nexus, with a standard statistical model and 
cross-national database. In the conclusion, we return to 
how the present study might speak to more conventional 
analyses.
6. Probing the Persistence Puzzle
 Viewing the data, it is clear that neither individual acts of 
overt or covert repression led to a decline in dissident be-
havior as expected by the conventional view (i.e., there is no 
straightforward indication of “success”). For example, as 
one can see in Figure 1, the arrests and raids that took place 
place on July 3, 4, 18, 21, and 25, as well as August 8 and 16, 
1968, did not prevent dissident behavior on August 27 and 
again on September 10 and 15. The basic argument is also 
undermined by the fact that the raid and mass arrest at New 
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Bethel (on March 31, 1969) – by far the largest and most se-
vere repressive act of the period – prompted the most ex-
tensive dissident response, continuing from April 1 to 
November 9, 1969. By the time of the raid and arrests in 
Mississippi during August 1971, the basic story was quite 
different. Now there was no growth in dissent after re-
pression. Indeed, barring a few later protests, RNA collective 
action was almost finished by that point. This is perhaps the 
only place where repression worked as most scholars sug-
gest (decreasing dissent after repression was used).
Having identified the varied outcomes of repression, the 
question remains: Why would coercive behavior be ap-
plied consistently despite its ineffectiveness in behavioral 
regulation? 
Figure 1: Contentious activity by the RNA and the US government
6.1. The Unconventional View: Delayed and Tactical
 The first explanation for the persistence puzzle was that 
repressive behavior continues despite dissent because: 1) 
the objective of authorities is long-term and not short-
term in nature; 2) the objective of authority is a tactical 
shift away from radicalism not a reduction in all dissident 
behavior; and 3) authorities perceive no other alter-
natives.
6.1.1. Effectiveness Deferred
The delayed impact thesis would lead us to expect some 
form of overt repression as the initial response to overt dis-
sident behavior and for there to be a state response with 
either breaks between episodes of coercive action (so as to 
allow the repression to take its effect) or for repressive be-
havior to be clustered temporally with dissent gradually 
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diminishing over time. In the case of the relationship be-
tween RNA dissent and US authorities, Figure 1 shows that 
while dissident behavior decreases over time, it is difficult 
to attribute such a result to the delayed effect of state be-
havior.
For one, repressive behavior does not respond to RNA ac-
tivity, challenging the state-responsivity argument. One can 
see that after the founding convention, the Black National-
ist organization engages in dissident behavior in roughly 
six distinct periods within which at least one event takes 
place every two weeks: 1) March 29–30, 1968; 2) June 
8–November 21, 1968; 3) February 8–August 31, 1969; 4) 
October 18, 1969–January 24, 1970; 5) April 1–June 4, 
1970; and 6) sporadic events from August 5, 1970, through 
April 15, 1973, after which activity wanes. In their attempt 
to counter the RNA, the authorities are approximately two 
months too late: the first arrests are in May of 1968. The 
delayed response of the authorities to dissident behavior 
appears to be a pattern. Thus, it is only at New Bethel (the 
first anniversary of the RNA) that the police respond im-
mediately to increasing activity.
After New Bethel (which involved a massive raid and mass 
arrests following a shooting that left two officers dead), ar-
rests continue for quite some time, responding to the in-
creased collective action of the RNA. Again, arrests 
decrease but this takes place amidst another increase of 
RNA activity in April (on the 12th, 17th, 18th and 23rd). As 
the dissident challenge continues into May (4th and 11th), 
this prompts another wave of police activity on the 13th, 
25th and 26th of the same month. Challenging the delayed 
response thesis in a different way, another wave of repres-
sive behavior in Detroit around the time of a Mississippi 
raid in August of 1971 represents sporadic arrests com-
pletely unrelated to dissident behavior, which was also tak-
ing place infrequently both before and after the arrests.
6.1.2. Substitution and Shifting Tactics
Investigation of this case supplies little support for the sub-
stitution argument either. If the RNA were influenced as 
advocates of this position suggest (following overt repres-
sive behavior conceived as either events [Lichbach] or epi-
sodes [Moore]), then one would see a decrease in one tactic 
(e.g., violent or non-violent behavior) and an increase in 
another (respectively, non-violent or violent activity). This 
appears to ignore information about what the objectives of 
the different activities were however.
For example, the RNA was initially committed to focusing 
its efforts on establishing its “nation” within the deep 
South. All discussion and preparation (e.g., speeches, mili-
tary training, conferences, workshops, and community 
meetings) concerned this activity and location. By 1971, 
however, the RNA had given up this rather large-scale, am-
bitious plan and focused on merely purchasing land in 
Mississippi for the establishment of a city-state as well as 
conducting a preliminary plebiscite; this would serve as the 
platform from which they could move back to the broader 
plan (Obadele 1995). This tactical shift is important for it 
supports specific aspects of existing research while sig-
nificantly challenging others.
Indeed, one could argue that Detroit-based repression of 
the RNA was successful because it compelled the Black 
radicals to move their base from Detroit to New Orleans 
(in May 1970). The organization still maintained a chapter 
in Detroit, but it moved its leadership and headquarters to 
the new location. While reducing the cost of collective ac-
tion, in line with the conventional conception of re-
pression, the geographic change was also undertaken to 
facilitate the move to the South (directly related to the or-
ganization’s ultimate objective and clearly most radical 
goal). From the new home base, with support as well as 
participation from the Detroit chapter, the RNA pur-
chased land in Mississippi and began to educate and train 
members throughout the organization for the next stage 
in state-building. At the same time, the RNA also began to 
reach out to the residents of Mississippi. Repression thus 
pushed the RNA not away from but toward radical be-
havior in an outcome that is inconsistent with the ex-
pectations of existing research.
6.1.3. Sticks as well as Carrots.
Regarding the third variant of the unexpected influence ar-
gument, it is clear that political authorities did not apply 
any other tactic against the RNA. By the time the Republic 
of New Africa emerged, the federal government was em-
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phasizing a “law and order” approach to poverty and civil 
unrest. This involved significant resources being given to 
police organizations, training in counter-dissident activity, 
and the granting of extensive leeway with regard to the use 
of coercive practices. In many respects, the context facilitat-
ing repressive behavior was most prevalent during this 
period (Goldstein 2000).
6.2. The Unexpected View: Pre-mobilization and Objective Management
 The second explanation for the persistence puzzle is that 
repressive behavior continues because its actual targets are 
those engaged in challenging behavior (i.e., challengers) 
not the challenges themselves (i.e., the challenging be-
havior). Here, state behavior is expected to limit RNA ef-
forts at establishing and sustaining collective action, and 
diminish the radicalism of their objectives.
6.2.1. Patterns in Pre-mobilization
Observing diverse aspects of RNA behavior such as meet-
ings and number of event attendees (Figure 2), one can see 
that despite consistent mention of infiltration (covert re-
pression) and several arrests (overt repression) – shown 
above in Figure 1, the organization initially increased the 
number of meetings and the number of attendees per 
meeting. Indeed, as Robert F. Williams (the first president 
of the RNA) noted: “Sometimes it was hard to tell the infil-
trators from the idiots” (Tyson 1999, 204). However, this 
did not dampen the mobilization efforts. But around No-
vember 24, 1968, one can also see that prior to the New 
Bethel incident the values diminish across both char-
acteristics. This suggests that the lagged influence of re-
pression was effective at weakening the RNA 
organizationally but not in any easily observable way.
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 75 – 95
Davenport and Loyle: Dissent and the Puzzle of Repressive Persistence 88
Figure 2: RNA Pre-mobilization activity
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As seen in the figure, the New Bethel incident in late March 
1969 represents an interesting period. Members came to 
Detroit from all over the United States for the first an-
niversary of the RNA. In the context of the declining char-
acteristics mentioned above, it appears that the meeting 
could not have occurred at a better time to reinvigorate the 
organization. New Bethel also represented a prime oppor-
tunity for the authorities to confront the African American 
dissident organization. With organizational characteristics 
declining (i.e., the number of people attending), one large 
raid with mass arrests and extensive interrogation could po-
tentially produce tremendous amounts of information 
about the organization. Additionally, living through such an 
experience could intimidate the victims and, through media 
coverage of the events, potential recruits. Not only was the 
RNA’s largest meeting to date completely disrupted (a dis-
aster for the organization), but the shooting of the police 
officers and the magnitude of police sanctions that followed 
was expected to turn public opinion against the RNA.
 From the record, the actual aftereffect of New Bethel was 
mixed, thus complicating the assessment of government re-
pression. On the one hand, the raid and arrests galvanized 
the members – slowly increasing the number of meetings 
held and the sheer breadth of participation by organiz-
ational members, supporters, and the curious (i.e., greater 
numbers of those attending spoke and/or engaged in what-
ever activity was being undertaken, such as leafletting). On 
the other hand, the events set in motion a gradual decline 
in the number of attendees at organizational functions. In 
line with the “Radical Flank Effect” (Della Porta 1995), 
mobilization increased but the actual number of individ-
uals involved in these activities decreased.
 By March 29, 1970, amidst a wave of police action, the 
number of meetings and number of people actively speak-
ing at events had begun to decrease again. Again, the effect 
of the police activity appears mixed. After this time, there 
were essentially no RNA meetings open to the public, just 
some special sessions of the governing council and miscel-
laneous get-togethers. Toward the end of the time series, 
after the last few arrests, there is a brief increase in number 
of meetings and number of attendees as the organization 
attempted to withstand this effort at disruption. These 
were short-lived however. Very soon there were no ac-
tivities reported at all.
6.2.2. Killing Claims
A second variant of the unexpected view maintains that 
authorities persist in their repressive efforts despite varying 
successes at behavioral regulation because the actual ob-
jective is to control dissident claims not behavior. In this 
theory, authorities are concerned with eliminating the 
most radical dissident goals. Evaluating the historical rec-
ord, this does not appear to be the case. In line with the 
earlier discussion of tactical shifts, repression did not alter 
the RNA’s objectives. They were always interested in setting 
up a Black nation, signified by their consistent use of the 
phrase “seize the land” at all meetings and in most pub-
lications. In fact, repression actually seemed to accelerate 
the RNA’s plans, prompting them to attempt to try to get 
Ocean-Hill Brownsville to secede in mid to late 1968 and 
their decision to move to Mississippi in 1971, much earlier 
than anticipated (i.e., the timetable was advanced).
 In this context, one might expect political authorities to 
persist in their use of repression against the RNA despite 
varying behavioral outcomes, because the black radicals 
were advancing their political agenda. We tend to disagree 
with this, however, because there is simply no evidence that 
RNA claims were a topic of discussion within police docu-
ments and thus there is no support in these sources for the 
claim-kill argument, at least not on a day-to-day basis. We 
do, however, see indications that the US government was 
utilizing laws concerning the RNA’s attempt to overthrow a 
sovereign government as a pretext for engaging in repres-
sive action. This does suggest that at a broader, more ag-
gregate level the content of the RNA’s challenge was 
relevant to government action.
6.3. The Unconcerned View: Protecting and Serving, not Countering and 
Eliminating
 In different ways, the previous two explanations for repres-
sive persistence are largely connected to behavioral regu-
lation: the first through an impact on overt collective 
action and one aspect of the second through an impact on 
pre-mobilization. Both presume that an evaluation of dis-
sident behavior (its frequency and trajectory) is taking 
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place over some unit of time and space. Exploring different 
influences, we find that the arguments identified above are 
not well supported. In an attempt to discover what is really 
taking place, we extend the kill claim argument further and 
consider an alternative explanation.
 On almost every dimension, it is clear that the RNA repre-
sented a serious threat to the United States political and so-
cial system, thereby meriting persistent repressive effort. It 
did not, however, threaten all aspects of the system equally, 
and this variation is important.
6.3.1. For the People
The symbolic order argument revolves around teaching 
lessons to specific subjects about proper behavior and 
likely responses to deviance. When threatened by political 
dissent, authorities engage in repression not to counter 
and/or eliminate challengers but to communicate to non-
participants that this form of political activity is illegit-
imate and that they will be sanctioned for engaging in such 
behavior. We find evidence that this was the lesson intend-
ed for African Americans. Specifically, political leaders at 
the local, state, and federal levels realized that the mobiliz-
ation potential for organizations like the RNA was sig-
nificant and that repressive action might prevent them 
growing in their appeal. We are aided in this investigation 
by a number of public opinion surveys conducted in Det-
roit during the period under investigation.
Concerned with the causes and aftereffects of the July 1967 
riot, the Detroit Free Press (1968) conducted a random 
probability sample survey of African American attitudes in 
August of the same year. A follow-up repeat study was con-
ducted in October of 1968. As the RNA was created on 
March 31, 1968, it comes into existence right between the 
two surveys. Given that it was engaging in diverse activities 
at the time without any high-profile repressive activities, if 
the proposition outlined above were correct we would ex-
pect to find a growth in sentiments favorable to the RNA: 
Black separatism, Black ownership, ethnic pride, distance 
from whites in particular and the United States in general.
Examining the surveys, we find some support for the gen-
eral argument regarding a favorable context for the RNA 
and the need for continued repressive behavior despite 
varying behavioral outcomes revealed within the govern-
ment’s data. The DFP survey shows that from August 1967 
to October 1968, Blacks generally felt that they had more to 
lose by engaging in violent action (from 53 to 63 percent) 
and that if war broke out the United States was worth 
fighting for (from 67 to 77 percent). However, there is also 
a clear finding that a specific subset of African Americans 
expressed interest in organizations like the Republic of 
New Africa. The research discloses that among rioters in 
1967 (10–12 percent of all respondents), non-religious in-
dividuals and the young were more likely to support Black 
nationalism, measured as accepting a “militant” position, 
avoiding whites socially, fighting with other African Ameri-
cans for rights, and building a separate Black society apart 
from whites in the United States or Africa.
While there are no explicit measures of repression in the 
survey, the authors do note a precipitous increase from 57 
to 71 percent in the number of respondents who identify 
police brutality as a problem that could lead to another 
riot. These results present an interesting paradox: repres-
sive action may be necessary to close the window for ad-
ditional radicalism by eliminating the challengers but the 
use of this behavior could be associated with open the 
window further by provoking the disengaged.
Of course, the surveys discussed here represent only two 
slices of a much more complex and dynamic pie. Implicit 
within this type of examination is the argument that the 
logic behind persistence associated with lessons is changed 
slowly, whenever modifications are provided in popular 
opinion. What carries the explanatory weight in between 
these alterations, however? For this, more and perhaps dif-
ferent information is needed. We return to this below.
6.3.2. For the Cash
The essence of the economic argument concerning repres-
sive persistence is that government applies coercion con-
sistently despite short-term failure to regulate behavior 
because it is attempting to protect economic relationships 
over the long term. The relevance of this explanation seems 
limited given the objectives of the RNA and its small de-
gree of success in realizing those objectives.
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In theory, the RNA threatened the US economy in different 
ways. Basically, the organization was interested in provid-
ing the six essentials of decent human life for its black con-
stituents: food, housing, clothing, health services, 
education, and defense. Hostile to the basic principles and 
practices of capitalism, the key to the RNA’s plans was a 
collective, full-employment strategy like in a socialist sys-
tem. Here, every individual would work at their chosen 
profession not for profit but for the greater good of the col-
lective. Clearly this economic strategy was a longer-term 
objective, but its essence fundamentally threatened the 
legitimacy of the US economy. In addition, potentially re-
moving the African American from the marketplace would 
have significantly damaged the American economic system, 
especially given the sheer size and spending patterns of this 
community.
One could argue that although the US economy was not 
substantively directly threatened by the actions and/or rhet-
oric of the Republic of New Africa, the symbolic challenge 
was significant. The RNA represented a socialistic, all-Black 
movement whose success might prove to be a challenge for 
a government and economy that had major problems meet-
ing the needs of African Americans. While this may be true, 
the available historical evidence appears to focus on ex-
plicitly political factors: nationhood, weapons, military 
training, and the potential for violence. The government 
records on the RNA discussed their economic plan in prin-
ciple, but, again, the day-to-day records discussing what the 
Republic was doing paid very little attention to their econ-
omic activities. This makes sense as the primary focus of 
the organization concerned government infiltration, avoid-
ing arrest, and paying the rent. Similarly, political factors 
were essential components of the RNA program. Equally 
important, however, a group of government institutions 
throughout the United States were specifically prepared to 
identify, monitor, and respond to the behavioral threat 
presented by the RNA. This is discussed below.
6.3.3. For the Troops
Instead of teaching lessons to the general population or 
protecting economic relations, the third argument at-
tributes repressive persistence to coercive agents themselves, 
as initially introduced by Gurr (see above) but modified/ex-
tended. Here it was argued that state coercion continues 
despite failure to regulate behavior because of the habitual 
patterns built into repressive institutions carrying out rel-
evant activity and permissiveness for such activities within 
governing elites. When applied to the Detroit case, it is clear 
that while coercive institutions were extremely important 
for understanding the persistence of repressive action, in an 
interesting twist, it is also revealed that the agents of re-
pression were able to continually apply coercive action in 
spite of regulatory failures because of the failures themselves 
and because of the ability of the relevant government or-
ganizations to manipulate the situation for their own pur-
poses. In a sense, repressive persistence is attributed to a 
crusade of government agents to “fight the good fight” 
where every failure became yet another reason and oppor-
tunity for them to prove themselves. Such an argument is a 
deparure from Gurr, who he maintained that coercive in-
stitutions would simply ignore inconsistent information or 
that prior successes would guide subsequent behavior.
In order to understand the role of coercive institutions in 
repressive persistence within our extension of Gurr’s ar-
gument, we must begin by noting that the authority’s re-
sponse to the RNA emerged during a special period in 
American and Detroit history. At the time, the general level 
of threat presented by black unrest was significant 
throughout the United States. During this period, the 
United States was struck by one of the largest rises in viol-
ent crime in its history. The sheer severity of civil unrest 
added another, more politicized dimension to this threat. 
In Detroit, the riot of 1967 represented nothing less than a 
watershed in local-level challenges to public order and re-
pressive action. The damage caused by the event and the 
authority’s response was extensive by any measure. During 
the riot, forty-three individuals were killed, hundreds 
wounded, and there were millions of dollars of property 
damage. In reaction, approximately 7,200 individuals were 
arrested, the city was essentially occupied, and numerous 
curfews and other restrictions on civil liberties were im-
posed for weeks after the event.
While the magnitude of the police response was significant, 
in many ways it was “too little, too late.” Prior to 1967, 
three separate reports by the community-police commis-
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sion highlighted the racial tensions in the city and the po-
tential for violence (Jacobs 1977, 145). In addition, there 
was a pervasive belief among patrolmen that the “riots” 
were not disorganized; rather, it was argued that they re-
flected a coordinated strategy of Black radicals such as the 
RNA to disrupt urban America. The event was important 
precisely because it (re)emphasized the perception that 
Blacks were a threat and that white people’s fears were 
legitimate. This provided the motivation for repressive ac-
tion (of almost any type and level of lethality) as well as 
permissiveness for such behavior – despite failures.
As a direct result of the riot, two important dynamics 
emerged. First, “(r)acial conflict [moved to] the heart of all 
Detroit-based politics” (Farley et al. 2000, 46). Second, 
whites largely moved out of Metro Detroit to the suburbs, 
leaving the urban environment to the Blacks and the pre-
dominantly white and southern police department. This 
movement was particularly problematic because the his-
torically insulated policing institutions of Detroit were al-
ready engaged in a rather heated battle with its 
geographically isolated Black residents. As Donner notes 
(1990, 291):
A number of cities, of which Detroit is a prime example, reflec-
ted in their police structures and target priorities a similar 
“urban pathology”: a decaying Black ghetto, … the emergence of 
potentially violent Black and white groups, and the development 
among white policemen of a “siege mentality” against the Black 
community. … after the ghetto riots of the late sixties, self-help 
and violence inevitably came to be regarded in both camps – po-
lice and ghetto – as a vital means of survival. “Law and order” 
became a coded battle cry as the police were transformed into an 
army defending white power and the status quo.
Exacerbating this, the diverse units that confronted the 
RNA were the ones most removed from ordinary police 
duties; the various sections of the “Red Squad” had very 
little contact with other parts of the department and had es-
sentially no oversight. Such a pattern continued after the 
riots, as increasingly aggressive special units emerged in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s: e.g., the “Big Four” and “Stop 
Robberies, Enjoy Safe Streets” (STRESS). These programs 
resulted in a large number of hostile Black-police inter-
actions, several deaths of African Americans, and significant 
inquiries by citizen as well as government committees.
In addition, in the lead-up to the riot, Detroit police de-
partment was engaged in a bitter fight with the Mayor of 
Detroit, which it won. After an at times extremely con-
tentious dispite (involving ticketing slow-downs and “sick-
ins” where officers would call in sick en masse and city 
lawsuits to prevent any disruption of law enforcement), the 
Mayor’s office settled with the police right before the riot, 
on terms as diverse as “seniority, grievance procedures, 
management rights, vacations, leaves [and union recogni-
tion]” (Bopp 1971, 172). Bargaining amidst a hostile inter-
action with the Mayor and confrontation on the streets 
significantly enhanced the collective identity of the police. 
It is in this context that a need to prove its worth and a lack 
of political accountability allowed repressive persistence to 
occur. Indeed, seemingly under siege and fighting the 
“good fight” to preserve an essentially white order over the 
black threat, governing authorities were exempted from 
having to justify any short-term lack of success of repres-
sive activities. Here, the “show” of force was sufficient to 
appease both the agents of repression, the principals who 
unleashed as well as stood over these agents, and the white 
constituency to which both were loosely accountable.
7. Conclusion
 For the last forty years, researchers investigating the rela-
tionship between dissent and repression have produced the 
same contradictory findings. On the one hand, individual 
acts of dissent always increase acts of repression but, on the 
other hand, individual acts of repression consistently have 
different influences on dissident behavior. While many 
scholars analyzed one of the two components of the rela-
tionship (either the influence of repressive behavior on dis-
sent or vice versa), no-one has yet attempted to explain the 
question that emerges when both results are considered 
simultaneously: when the outcome of repressive efforts is 
largely uncertain, why would authorities continue to use 
coercion (presumably in an effort to decrease dissent) – 
what we refer to as the puzzle of repressive persistence? Are 
states crazy or is there some method to the madness? This 
article sought to explore this issue by identifying diverse 
explanations and examining one of the most thoroughly 
documented state-dissident dyads available – the inter-
action between US authorities and the Republic of New Af-
rica between 1968 and 1973.
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 Specifically, considering an event catalog as well as diverse 
historical documents covering the state-dissident inter-
action, we investigated three different answers to the 
puzzle. One suggests that repression works but that it has 
been examined inappropriately (through lags, substitution 
effects, and the fact that governments use other tech-
niques). A second explanation posits that repressive be-
havior may work but in a way different from that 
examined. Here, it is expected that repression influences 
pre-mobilization (meetings, recruitment, and objective 
formation). A third explanation suggests that individual 
acts of repression are not applied to influence dissent; 
rather, they are applied to sustain the identity of the agents.
Considering the US-RNA case, we find the most support for 
the third explanation. While individual acts of repression do 
not immediately decrease dissent, the magnitude of the 
threat posed by a radical Black Nationalist organization was 
significant, as was the insulated and combative identity of 
Detroit-area policing organizations. Indeed, these factors 
reveal not only why the repressive campaign against the 
RNA was initiated but also why it continued despite the 
varying effectiveness of state coercion.
 From the work provided here, a new set of hypotheses 
emerge, which require further investigation beyond the 
case explored here. For example, if the argument above is 
correct, then we should expect to see varying acceptance 
for repressive failures across contexts. Citizens as well as 
leaders within authoritarian systems should be more ac-
cepting of failures compared to democracies, as the former 
are not subject to citizen scrutiny, evaluation, and punish-
ment at the ballot box. At the same time, even within 
democracies, we would also expect that when a behavioral 
challenge is significantly threatening, authorities may be 
able to persist despite repressive failures – at least for a 
time, as long as they can show some effort toward, if not 
evidence of progress. The exact nature of the threat, the 
duration of time that states can fail without repercussions, 
and the meaning of non-events (success or no evidence at 
all) are all issues that require consideration.
In many respects these are not new issues for social scien-
tists; rather, they are new for the current generation of con-
flict researchers as the present way of investigating relevant 
behavior has become largely divorced from the theories ex-
plored here. Indeed, questions of state responsiveness to 
citizen electoral threats are mainstays within the literature. 
What the research in this article reveals, however, is some of 
the tensions in this work. For example, if governments are 
to respond to behavioral challenges directed against them 
and if citizens are expected to evaluate their leaders regard-
ing the appropriate/effective use of repression, then it is 
crucial to understand precisely how these two interact. If 
citizens believe that challenges are severe enough, then they 
may be willing to tolerate significant amounts of repression, 
but if information concerning behavioral threats and the re-
pressive action directed against them are both provided by 
authorities, then this may not represent much of a check on 
their activity. If the media is censored in some manner and/
or information is withheld from citizens, then this further 
undermines political accountability. How long can in-
formation about dissent, repression and behavioral effec-
tiveness be withheld from citizens without electoral and/or 
attitudinal aftereffects? If authorities manipulate in-
formation about dissent and behavioral regulation, what are 
the repercussions? These questions reveal that the puzzle of 
persistence sits not only at the core of conflict studies, but at 
the core of more broadly defined political science.
In addition to challenging the topics that are explored in 
existing research of state repression, the current work also 
prompts researchers to alter what they collect information 
on. At present, scholars are focused on vague nationally-ag-
gregated structural characteristics. Our work suggests that 
researchers should attempt to understand the objectives 
and interests of both principals (e.g., politicians) and their 
agents (e.g., police, military, intelligence service, and mil-
itias). As a community, we have been more focused on the 
former than the latter but there are still limitations. With 
the former, we are not very good at understanding what is 
perceived by the relevant actors or how they understand/
explain what is done. With the latter, we know very little 
about those that pull the trigger, beat the protestor, and/or 
torture the victim. Newer work is pushing in this direction 
(e.g., Cunningham 2004; Butler et al. 2007) but clearly 
more effort needs to be extended toward understanding 
why governments agents do what they do. This involves not 
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just looking at these actors functionally as to how they re-
late to the state but also viewing them organizationally, 
psychologically, as well as sociologically. With these ad-
ditions, our investigations into repression, its withdrawal, 
its escalation, and its persistence would be immensely im-
proved.
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